Where policies are not expressly maritime – or are combination policies with some maritime and traditional non-maritime coverage parts – there is a fair amount of uncertainty as to whether a case should be in federal court. The Second Circuit confronted these issues in Folksamerica Reinsurance Co. v. Clean Water of New York Inc. (2d Cir. June 30, 2005), a case that may well have impact on whether disputes associated with hurricane Katrina will be subject to federal-court jurisdiction, even though the particular facts concerned a bodily injury claim brought by a worker cleaning a vessel.

Clean Water was one of several entities covered under the policy at issue, which contained both a “Shiprepairers Legal Liability” section and a Comprehensive General Liability section. This package policy had combined limits for both sections, and a single premium for the policy as a whole. It was the insurer that argued for admiralty jurisdiction, arguing that it had a stronger basis for a misrepresentation defense under the standards of federal admiralty law.

The Second Circuit’s opinion is a lengthy tour of the issues concerning the standards for divining which types of contracts are sufficiently salty as to qualify for admiralty jurisdiction. The court characterized the question before it as a seemingly “simple inquiry: Is the Policy a maritime contract giving rise to admiralty jurisdiction?” Slip op. at 5. The federal courts possess a unique lawmaking authority under Article III for admiralty matters, with the essential idea being that it is important to have a uniform law for maritime matters even in the absence of Congressional action. This power stems from the need to “protect maritime commerce,” (p. 6). In the case before it, the dispute concerned “an insurance claim based on a ship-maintenance-related injury sustained by a ship oil-tank cleaner aboard an ocean-going vessel in navigable waters.” (p. 8)

Nevertheless, the coverage had little to do with maritime issues: the question concerned ordinary CGL coverage. While a portion of the package policy unquestionably was maritime in character, the coverage under which the dispute arose was the general-liability section, and on this basis the district court found the policy to be divisible and that the nonmaritime aspects predominated (and thus there was no jurisdiction).

The Second Circuit reviewed recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that it believed undermined aspects the prior Second Circuit precedent. In general, “admiralty jurisdiction will exist over an insurance contract where the primary or principal objective of the contract is the establishment of ‘policies of marine insurance,’” (p. 12) but positing the issue this way obviously is circular.

Courts typically have looked at whether the maritime aspects predominate or whether they are incidental. The Second Circuit here found there was “nothing intrinsically ‘shore side’ about a CGL policy.” (p. 15). Instead, the keys are the terms of the insurance and the nature of the business insured, with the label or form of the policy not being determinative. (p. 16-17)

In the case at hand, the policy excluded typical or traditional maritime risks, though the court found ultimately an overlap in the coverage provided for premises/operations, products, completed-operations, pollution, and incidental-contract coverage. While concluding that the contracts coverage was not maritime, the Second Circuit found that the other portions were in the circumstances maritime in nature.

In Clean Water, the insured’s repair and maintenance operations on seagoing vessels implicated marine issues, and the insured’s replacement of parts on the ship in its maintenance activities similarly were maritime. As the court stated, “[t]he risk of injuries from, and damage to, a ship after defective or faulty repair or maintenance is a ‘maritime risk’ that includes the risk of ‘the loss of the ship or goods.’” (p. 22) While this coverage overlapped with P&I coverage, that confirmed rather than confuted admiralty jurisdiction.

In finding that disputes under the policy to be subject to admiralty jurisdiction, the court summarized:

In the circumstances of this case – a contract with two sections, one of which provides fully marine insurance [the shiprepairers legal liability], and the other specifically modified to cover maritime risks – we conclude that the Policy is marine in nature . . . [and that] the primary objective of the policy is to establish marine insurance. (p. 29)

The Second Circuit conceded that part of the policy unquestionably was nonmarine and that the policy did not fall within the traditional categories of marine insurance, yet it found there was a sufficient nexus to the risks of the sea as to merit the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. The court’s lengthy opinion is not altogether satisfactory in guiding litigants on the question of how much of the policy needs to be maritime in nature and the required nexus between the dispute at issue and the maritime portions of the coverage for federal-court lawmaking to govern and for the federal court to be seised of jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1333(1).